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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
A couple of months ago, I was listening to The World at 
One, which was running a piece on public services. 
Naturally enough, they referred to Beveridge; surprisingly 
(or possibly not) they stated his political affiliation as being 
'Labour'. An indignant telephone call to the duty officer 
to point out that Beveridge had sat as a Liberal MP and 
subsequently peer was met with the question 'Is that 
Beverage as in drink?'.
This editorial, however, is not about the dumbing-down 
of the BBC! When Beveridge wrote his famous report 
about combating the five giants of want, disease,o o ' 7
ignorance, squalor and idleness, he never advocated 
giantism as his preferred structure for the NHS. Indeed, 
in the Parliamentary debates on the establishment of the 
NHS, many Labour MPs argued for a decentralised 
structure with strong involvement from the communities 
to be served by, say, each hospital.
Elsewhere in this issue is a somewhat technical article 
by me on the form of corporate vehicle that might be used 
in a decentralised public sector. This editorial addresses 
the wider canvass.
If there is something I profoundly distrust in British 
political dialogue, it is what I call 'bogus adversarialism'   
the concept of 'either/or' rather than 'both/and'. It 
applies, for example, to the shareholder/stakeholder 
debate; I endeavoured to unpick this in my 1997 IALS 
lecture on the issue. It certainly applies in the so-called 
'debate' on the rival merits of the public and private 
sectors, where too much of the argument has hitherto 
been devoted to arguing the exclusive advantages of the 
one and the ineptness (or greed) of the other.
This brings us on to the nexus of issues relating to the 
private finance initiative and/or public/private partnership, 
where too many mastodons have been bellowing at each 
other across the primaeval swamp of idees fixes.
The PFI pluses are as follows. Given the constraints on 
immediate government expenditure, investment is 
accelerated, and private sector management can often 
bring a breath of fresh air to a public sector, which is too 
frequently over-administered and under-managed. 
Negotiating a PFI contract forces a concentration ono o
strategic objectives over a longer period.
There is also a list of minuses. PFI is effectively forced 
on local authorities without offering them a free choice of 
other options, and the small number of tendering 
contractors does not provide an effective market. The 
criteria for establishing the applicable investor rate of 
return (IRR) are dubious, transactional costs and 
negotiating time are excessive, and lengthy contracts are, 
inevitably, undemocratic in nature.
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What, then, is the conclusion? It is simply that there are 
good and bad PFI contracts, and that there will be more 
good ones as the public sector develops its experience and 
expertise in negotiating them. That in turn means that such 
experience and expertise should be positively cultivated 
within the public sector.
But the choice of whether or not to adopt the PFI route 
should be decentralised to the nations and regions of theo
United Kingdom, not be imposed by Whitehall rigging the 
balance of advantage. After all. if the Governmento '
proclaims itself in favour of decentralising the public 
sector, a first step would be the loosening of Treasury 
control over financing methods.o
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